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THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PATENT POLICY AT THE
CROSS ROADS: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE RETENTION
OF TRADITIONAL INCENTIVESt
by

Arthur John Keefe* and David M. Lewis, Jr.**
Perhaps the most serious attack on the American patent system in
recent years has been in the area of government-sponsored research.
Many persons have expressed grave reservations about granting an
inventor a protective right to a patent for the statutory seventeen year
period,1 when he has conceived a patentable process under a research and
development contract with the United States. A basic question to be
asked in studying any aspect of the patent system is whether the express
Constitutional intent of promoting "the Progress of Science and the
Useful Arts"' is being preserved. A worthwhile patent system should
encourage invention and benefit the general public welfare by providing
a stimulus to make these new products quickly available in the marketplace.
The authors urge that the Department of Defense's policy of leaving
title to patents developed under its research and development contracts,
while retaining a royalty-free license in the military applications of such
inventions,' is meeting the test expressed above. This policy, to which
the Department of Defense has adhered for five years, is commonly
known as a "license" policy. The Department of Agriculture, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) however, follow another policy-that of taking title
for the government to patents filed pursuant to these contracts. This
approach is commonly called a "title" policy.
The battleground between these competing policies has been welldefined in recent Congressional sessions. In hearings before the Subcommittee on Patents and Scientific Inventions of the House Committee
t This article expresses the personal views of the authors for which no one else is responsible.
* A.B., LL.B., Professor of Law, The Law School, The Catholic University of America.
* Third year law student at The University of Virginia Law School.
35 U.S.C. S 154 (1958).
U. S. CONST. ART. I, S 8, cl.8.
3 Such provision is found in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations, ASPR 9107.1 (July 1, 1960).
2
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on Science and Astronautics' (conducted last year by Representative
Erwin Mitchell, and hereafter called the Mitchell Subcommittee), a
proposal to amend NASA's title provisions was under consideration.
Senator Russell B. Long's Subcommittee of the Select Committee on
Small Business' was examining, at the same time, the effect of the license
approach on small businesses, especially as it is practiced by the Department of Defense.'
A criticism of the license approach which recurred many times in
the hearings was that some companies are building up advantageous
commercial patent monopolies by keeping title. But, is this alone good
enough reason for revising the procurement procedures when the problem posed is essentially one which might be handled under the antitrust
laws? The law in this area has developed to the extent that most patent
abuses can be effectively curbed. In Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United
States,' the Supreme Court warned against the affixing of provisions in
restraint of trade to licensing agreements by the patentee. The sanctions
of the Sherman Act have been extended to licensing agreements which
combine monopolistic practices with the fixing of prices to be charged
by the licensees.8 Any such unlawful arrangements could surely be overthrown today without reference to how the patents were acquired by the
licensor.
In addition, since Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,' the court
can order a patentee who abuses antitrust laws by collusive combinations
to fix reasonable royalties on its licenses in the interest of increased competition. The language of the Supreme Court, however, suggested that
there are constitutional barriers which would preclude an order that the
patents be dedicated to the public royalty-free:
That a patent is property protected against appropriation both by individuals and by government has long been settled. In recognition of this
quality of a patent the courts, in enjoining violations of the Sherman Act
arising from the use of patent licenses, agreements, and leases, have abstained
10
from action which amounted to forfeiture of the patents.
4 Hearings on P. L. 85-568 Before the Subcommittee on Patents and Scientific Inventions of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 86th Cong., 1st Sess (August 19,
20, November 30, December 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 1959).
5 Hearings on the Effect of Patent Policies on Competition, Monopoly, Economic
Growth, and Small Business Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Select Committee on Small
Business, 86th Cong., 1st Sess (December 8, 9, 10, 1959).
6 No attempt is made to examine all the testimony in these hearings. For a more detailed investigation, the reader is referred to the texts of these hearings. In addition see
Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 240 on S. 3156 and S. 3550 Before the Subcommittee on
Patents, Trademarks of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess (May
17, 18, 1960).
7 309 U. S. 436 (1940).
8United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U. S. 287 (1948).
9323 U. S. 386 (1945).
ld., at 415.
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Nevertheless that dedication has been accomplished, under judicial pressuring, through the use of consent decrees which are in wide usage under
the antitrust laws."
It is true that a patentee may suppress a patent free of the antitrust
sanctions." If public exigencies direct, however, the government will not
be helpless in suppression cases. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1958), the
owner of a patent may sue in the Court of Claims to collect damages
when the government makes use of his patent without a license. Mr.
William H. Davis, representing New York City Bar Association, advised
the Mitchell Subcommittee"3 that the government, if need be, might
infringe a patent without the institution of a condemnation suit and pay
reasonable compensation when sued under section 1498. The payment
would satisfy the constitutional ramifications' 4 which prompted the judicial restraint in Hartford-Empire,supra.
Thus, the government has remedies at its disposal to deal with various patent abuses when they arise. On this point, there would seem to
be no need to disturb a well-ordered license policy at the procurement
level.
The fact that government funds, rather than private risk capital, are
being expended gives rise to other serious public policy considerations.
Senator Long advanced the proposition that the public is caught in a
squeeze play, having to pay twice for inventions under a license policy.'
First, the public pays in tax dollars to finance the research; second,
industrial concerns which make up part of the public must pay royalty
fees to share in the production of the inventions, and then the public
ultimately pays the price of the finished product on the consumer market.
Is this a valid observation? The answer, so far as the Department of
Defense is concerned, has to be no. What the public pays for in reality
is the royalty-free license which the Department of Defense reserves for
its purposes. This factor is taken into account, during negotiations, in
the attempt to arrive at the consideration to be paid the contractor. If
the government were to demand title at the outset the consideration
would undoubtedly be a good deal higher, the cost of procurement would
rise, and the public would be paying the same price, or better, in a lump
11 In this connection see Swift & Co. et al. v. United States, 276 U. S. 311 (1928), foc
a discussion of the Attorney General's authority in imposing sanctions under consent decrees.
12 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405 (1908).
'8 See note 4 supra at 461-463.
14 U. S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."
15See note 5 supra at 115 and 319.
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sum. The public welfare would suffer to the extent that the Department
of Defense would be unable to meet its vital procurement demands under
such an arrangement. Indeed, it has been urged vehemently that some
companies would refuse Department of Defense contracts if conditions
reserving full title to patents in the government, were attached.' Or, in
the alternative, contracts might be taken, but the contractor will assign
second-rate technicians to the projects to lessen the chance for an important and meaningful break-through. 7 In either case the defense program
loses the benefit of valuable know-how.
Nor, is it entirely sound to say, merely because public funds are
being expended in the research and development field, that there is no
risk involved on the part of the contractor. Skilled personnel are devoted
to a research and development project in the hope that the corporate
contractor will be able to score a break-through and that follow-on contracts will subsequently issue. If such expectations are unfulfilled the
contractor has a relatively small profit margin, generally in the neighborhood of six percent, to show for his efforts. Many such break-throughs
might well be ascribed to prior know-how and competence on the part
of the personnel working for the contractor. Yet, when these intangible factors, which may have greatly influenced the awarding of the
contract, contribute to the discovery of a patentable invention, the title
would be lost to the company if the resulting invention were in actual
pursuit of the contract. Many inequities would result. It is not surprising
that many companies with a reasonable anticipation of success would be
wary of accepting government work.
It is conceded that there are some "captive" industries, notably
military aircraft, which could be forced to accept research and development work under repugnant conditions. It might be argued that no
private risk is apparent in these situations, since so much of the know-how
has been accrued on government funds. Still, there are administrative
difficulties which would be encountered. First, it would be difficult at the
negotiation stage to determine what, if anything, will result from the
contract. It would be extremely vexing to attempt to place a price tag
on the ultimate significance and commercial value of something which
is not yet in existence. Therefore, contracting will bog down in negotiations unless provision is made allowing for further negotiations and
adjustments during the life of the contract. The shrewd contractor, realiz16 See note 4 supra at 398-399 and 412.
17 Id., at 419-421. Note particularly the testimony of Mr. J. King Harness, representing
Automobile Manufacturers Association and Michigan Patent Law Association.
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ing for instance that space inventions might open up an entirely new
commercial field in the near future, may not be willing to do business on
such a basis, even if provision is made for raising fees. There is no assurance that today's captive industry might not discover a newly arisen
collateral market in the commercial field tomorrow.
Some have attempted to make an analogy between the relationship
of the contractor and the government and that of the inventor-employee
and his corporation. The argument here is that the company is financing
the inventor's research and is taking title to his patents pursuant to
standard employment contracts. The distinction between these two relationships was well pointed out by Charles Shelton, Director of the United
Aircraft Corporation, before the Mitchell Subcommittee.18 He urged
that the corporate researcher is in the business of manufacturing and
selling products while the employee, by very nature, contracts to sell his
services. Emphasis in other testimony was to the effect that the employee
receives job security plus other current employee incentives such as
retirement pensions, advancements in position, and stock bonuses. The
contractor has none of these fringe benefits. Being a lone wolf in a highly
competitive field, he lacks the benefit of any sort of contract security but
must have means to protect his present accrual of know-how to insure
his success and possibly even his survival in the future. Corporate ingenuity is a powerful asset which it would be foolish to bargain away in
full, while the employee is able to insure his personal security by just
such an agreement.
These arguments probably fall short of satisfying the public conscience in full. Certainly, they lose some force in the case of the one
hundred percent or "captive" government contractor. It is helpful to ask
then what positive public good is being served when the government
takes title to patents. It might seem quite sound to advocate a system
whereby title to patents developed under research and development contracts is vested in the government on the premise that information placed
in the public domain and made available to all of industry would more
readily be put to use for the public welfare. The answer is that the
American patent system was drafted against a background of competitive
enterprise. In such a system as this, license rights available to all competitors may be of little value to any of them. Mr. James D. Burns,
representing the National Council of Patents Associations, presented the
following illustration before the Mitchell Subcommittee:
18 Id., at 240-241.
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All right. Let us take a look at what has happened in the Alien Property
Custodian's field. We vested [-] our Government vested all enemy-owned patents in the Alien Property Custodian. The Alien Property Custodian forthwith
put out the most expensive brochures I have ever seen, the most expensive
paper, the most beautiful, glamorous thing, telling what a wonderful thing it
was going to do for American industry. They were going to grant licenses at
$50 apiece base to try to cover a little bit of the clerical overhead. Nobody
wanted those licenses. Everybody could have them and what everybody can
have nobody wants, particularly where it takes investment to develop and
create a market.
Who is going to go out and spend that money and create the market
and have his arch competitor move in? Somebody, as spokesman for that
agency, may tell you they granted a whole lot of licenses. Well,19 at $50,
what the heck. But nobody used them, nobody exploited the rights.

This type of situation prompted William H. Davis, New York patent
attorney to cite a parallel between the government as patent holder and
the Parable of the Unfaithful Servant."0 The patent rights might be
expected to become as valueless as the talents which were buried in the
ground. There might be a taker now and then, but he would most certainly be running a great risk in plunging into mass production without
enjoying a competitive advantage. But, when the incentive to bring new
products to market is left in industry, the public will benefit.
Should the government then take upon itself the burden of bringing
these new products to market when the incentive to private industry is
undermined? The government would have to exercise its exclusionary
rights under the patents by suing in the courts to enjoin infringers. This
conit has not done in the past.' The government would have to police
were retractors extensively to determine that all patentable processes
ported, as there might well be some hedging under a title system. Admittedly, these might constitute valid, constitutional government functions.
However, many taxpayers might rightly question the wisdom of added
governmental activity and expense in a sphere that could be handled
effectively in industry.
It is interesting to note that the Mitchell Subcommittee discovered
a middleground between license and title upon which to base its Report.
The middle of the road approach suggested was a set of criteria which a
contracting officer would apply as a test, to decide whether the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration should acquire title or license only
to patents filed under research and development contracts. The criteria,
'Old., at 223.
20 Id., at 456.
21 ld., at 395-396. Note especially the testimony of Richard Whiting, Vice-President of
the American Patent Law Association.
22 STAFF OF HOUSE CoMM. ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, 86th CONG., 2D SESS.,
REPORT OF THE HEARINGS ON P. L. 85-568 OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS AND
SCIENTIFIC INVENTIONs (March 8, 1960).
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as set out below, are admittedly a move away from the straight title
approach which has been NASA's practice in the past.
In determining whether the public interest and equities of the contractor
would be best protected by the reservation of an irrevocable, nonexclusive,
nontransferable, royalty-free license, by the acquisition of the entire right,
title, and interest to the invention involved, or by the reservation or acquisition of other rights, the National Aeronautics and Space Administrator should
consider(1) Any of the following elements which may exist, being circumstances normally favoring retention of title by the contractor:
(A) Where the technological field being explored under the
contract is so related to fields of commercial endeavor that the inventions likely to result would have substantial promise of commercial
utility and their early development would be apt to benefit the
national economy;
(B) Where the insistence upon more than an irrevocable,
non-exclusive, nontransferable, royalty-free license for governmental
use would preclude or seriously impair contracts for the desired
research and development work and alternative sources for the contract are not readily available;
(C) Where inventions likely to be involved under the contract have been conceived and constructively reduced to practice by
the contractor prior to the contract; and
(D) Where the contractor has extensive competence and experience in the field of technology which is to be explored under
the contract and inventions likely to result would be attributable to
such competence and experience;
(2) Any of the following elements which may exist, being circumstances normally favoring the right to acquire title by the Government:
(A) Where the contract calls for exploration into fields which
directly concern the public health, safety, or welfare and the inventions likely to result would be useful directly in such fields, and the
public interest would be best served by making such inventions
available for all to produce or use without payment of royalties;
(B) Where it is likely that any inventions actually reduced to
practice under the contract will have depended in substantial degree
upon the prior or parallel conceptions and work or other parties,
governmental or private;
(C) Where the Government has been, at the time of contracting, the sole or prime developer of the field of technology involved,
or has provided all or virtually all of the funds required for the
operations and activities of the contractor in such field; and
(D) Where the field of technology involved in the contract is
entirely new without significant commercial or private history, and
with little chance of nongovernmental development in the foreseeable future; . . .23
28 Id., at 34-35. These criteria were proposed as a statement of legislative history behind the amendment of section 305 (a) of the NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ACT

OF 1958. The proposed amendments were part of H. R. 12049 which passed the House of
Representatives but was not reported out of committee in the U. S. Senate.
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A great deal of interest has arisen in these criteria as to whether the
Department of Defense might incorporate them into its procurement
regulations. This, of course, would represent a move away from the
license policy now practiced by the Department of Defense."
Perhaps a general criticism of the use of such criteria is that they
would be very difficult to administer. The criteria are framed in very
broad language and do not define exclusive, pigeon-holed categories.
Many situations can be envisioned wherein title equities and license
equities both exist; the contracting officer is in a dilemma when such
conflicts develop. It would be nearly impossible to frame such guidelines
with enough clarity to assure a certainty of application in any given
situation. It is certain, however, that criteria such as these would be
unworkable in regulations which aim for precision. The negotiations
picture would be beset with undue complexities.
In interpreting the criteria set out in section (2) (A) the contracting
officer might well be inclined to inquire what invention developed under
a Defense Department contract does not "directly concern the public
health, safety, or welfare." Indeed, the entire field of government contracting is carried on for the purpose of satisfying some aspect of "public
welfare." The language is not limited to the development of "a big and
important weapon of great interest to national defense." Mr. A. L. Lyman,
President of the California Research Corporation, suggested this as an
instance in which the government should contemplate taking title. " The
language here could just as well have reference to brakes on a jeep or
landing gear on airplanes. These are two inventions which "would have
substantial promise of commercial activity," to suggest but one troublesome conflict with license criteria.
Is the situation corrected if specific areas of health, safety and welfare
are clearly designated? It would seem that it is in these very areas where
the patent incentive should be retained if the public is to benefit. There
is testimony to the effect that the Surgeon General, for instance, feels the
need for patent incentives to induce companies to research in the cancer
field."6 This is a grim realization of the fact that most drug companies
are more profit-minded than Nobel Prize minded. Moreover, as has been
pointed out, the taking of title by government will probably result in the
burying of discoveries for want of an entrepreneur to exploit them. The
government has sufficient authority to deal with private concerns which
See note 3 supra.
See note 4 supra at 385.
26 See note 5 supra at 360-362. Note particularly the testimony of Mr. Parke M. Banta,
General Counsel, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
24
25
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would exploit such inventions in abuse of the patent laws. The government probably has sufficient additional authority along this line either to
condemn or infringe a patent and pay a reasonable compensation to the
original owner. The possibility of future patent abuses is hardly a contingency which the contracting officer is competent to anticipate during
negotiations.
Section (2) (B) of the title criteria is quite ambiguous, especially in
its use of the term "substantial degree." Of course, every invention depends somewhat upon prior discovery. It is submitted, however, that this
criterion would be a guide tending to direct the contracting officer to
provide for government title to all improvement patents. This covers a
very wide and vital area of Defense Department contracting. Such a provision would tend greatly to hamstring negotiations on extremely important projects.
On the other hand, the words "prior or parallel concept" represent
a term of art to the members of the patent law profession. 7 The unique
nature of an invention must be shown by any potential patentee who
applies to the Patent Office." This criterion could be construed to require
the very basic ingredients of novelty which must be established before a
patent issues. The Subcommittee must have been using this term of art
in another context, for if a contractor's employee failed to establish the
novelty of his invention satisfactorily, there would be no patent issued to
which the government could obtain title.
Section (2) (B) then probably would apply in a situation in which
a team of contractors are working on one project. A situation could arise
where Contractor C makes the actual break-through in developing a
patentable invention but is aided by information gleaned from prior
efforts of Contractors A and B, who fell just short of success. C's equitable
right to claim title might be a matter of some concern, but this situation
presents a question primarily of his rights in relation to A and B. The
government's equity is no greater than if C had been the only contractor
from beginning to successful completion. The criterion does not include
the factor of governmental funds being expended several times for the
same project with only one successful result. Granted, this additional
condition might give rise to an equity in the government's favor. Giving
the government title in the case where several contractors work as a team
and borrow experience from each other's efforts deprives all of the contractors of the traditional incentive. It is difficult to discern the logical
basis for such a result. Section (2) (B), as framed, makes little sense.
2TSee 35 U.S.C. S 102(g)
28

(1958).
35 U.S.C. SS 101-103 (1958).
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Section (2) (C) appears to contemplate special treatment for the
captive industries, discussed above. Despite the apparent equities in favor
of the government in this area, the Department of Defense has treated
all of its contractors alike in the application of license provisions. Mr.
Emerson Reichard, Jr., representing Aerojet--General Corporation, explained to the Long Committee the reasons his company is interested in
retaining title to patents:
Why then does Aerojet-General Corp. continue to file patent applications when it obtains no commercial advantage? There are a number of
reasons for this. One, of course, is the hope that at some future time a commercial market for one or more of the products involved will be developed,
which would permit this company to broaden its line of commercial products.
Another important reason is the fact that we are faced with the problem of
preventing others from rediscovering an invention made by us in the performance of classified work and obtaining a patent which would hinder or
impair our activities under United States Government contracts or induce the
Government to grant production contracts to the later discoverer by reason of
the patent obtained by him. This problem stems from the fact that an organization such as ours is not permitted in the usual course of events to publish
articles disclosing simple improvements and discoveries so as to place them
within the public domain because of security restrictions governing most of
our work. Thus the only certain way open to us for preventing the acquisition
of an adverse patent by another and perhaps later discoverer is to file an
application to the U. S. Patent Office to obtain a firm record date for the
invention, thus establishing our priority. Another reason, often overlooked,
is the professional stimulus which results from the maintenance of an aggressive patent policy by a corporation such as Aerojet-General Corp. The professional esteem which is associated with the issuance of a U. S. patent to an
inventor as well as the modest financial remuneration given the inventor
under Aerojet-General Corp.'s Patent Award Plan is considered by us to be a
substantial stimulus to original and incentive thinking in the performance of
our work. We consider this stimulus important in view of the practical impossibility of monitoring the thoughts and work of individuals in an organization as large as ours to be certain that all inventions are promptly reported so
that appropriate action can be taken toward obtaining patent protection and
also to insure that inventive contributions are brought to the attention of
those who 2are in a position to implement and use them to advance the state
of the art. 9

The Long Subcommittee, of course, was concerned primarily with
the effect of government patent policies on small business. Mr. Reichard
expressed the belief that a title policy in this area would be of a greater
harm to small businesses than to the larger corporations. He explained
that a good portion of such contract work is subcontracted to small business which gets the advantage of the license policy. Patents, though of
a somewhat dubious commercial application in this area, undoubtedly
do provide an important incentive to small businesses to take the subcontracts. A commercial break-through, however remote a possibility,
could transform a smaller company into a bonanza overnight.
In addition it should be stressed again that even though research in
29

See note 5 iumra at 105.
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certain fields is being exclusively financed by public funds the government
is getting the full benefit of that for which it pays in the rights under a
royalty-free license. Commercial exploitation and licensing of patents has
not been a traditional government function, and there is grave doubt as
to whether it would be an efficient one. While equitable considerations
might tend to favor government ownership, practical realities certainly
would favor development by industry with its commercial know-how.
The worst that can be said for this result is that it represents subsidization.
This is not a new phenomenon in American economic development.
The main trouble with the criterion set out in section (2) (D) is
that it would be very hard to administer. First of all, one might ask what
and when is a "field of technology. . . entirely new?" Does this apply to
so large an area as represented by jets and missiles? The latter portion of
the criterion is of little help in directing the contracting officer to form
a judgment on the likelihood of "nongovernmental development in the
foreseeable future." This presents another situation where the contracting
officer cannot make a valid determination and must rely on untrustworthy
speculations. In two areas, atomic energy and space development, the
Department of Defense has precluded any such speculation by placing in
its procurement regulations provisions8" to coincide with the title practices
of the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Space and Aeronautics Administration. Section (2) (D) would be very difficult to work
with unless such specific areas of research are spelled out.
Why are not the patent incentives important in the "new" fields?
In time such areas of research will give rise to potential commercial
markets just as will the captive areas covered in the criterion set out in
section (2) (D). Of course, the new commercial applications which
arise will prove to be very valuable and dramatic. In some cases it will
be difficult to classify these new applications of inventive knowledge as
strictly commercial as they will be of such a general public interest that
many might consider them best managed by the government. However,
it would not be nearly so troublesome to distinguish those applications
which are directly concerned with the national defense effort from the
others. The Defense Department would be in a new and strange position
in attempting to introduce into the marketplace the commercial products
which are not foreseeable today but which will inevitably become realities.
The solution at this point would be for the Department of Defense to license private enterprise without the allowance of competitive advantages.
For reasons heretofore mentioned, the logic of this system is basically un3

0ASPR 9-107.4, 9-107.7 (July 1, 1960).
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sound. The new products will be discovered, manufactured, and marketed
sooner and more surely if the patents are left to industry.
Various arguments and counter-arguments in this complex policy
area are due to be discussed again in the new Congress. The legislators
may be expected to restudy the present programs and to arrive at new
compromises between the more obvious imperfections and injustices of
either a straight title or license system. It is hoped that they are able to
advance keener guidelines than those represented by the Mitchell criteria.
This promises to be an exacting task. Whether any action is contemplated
regarding a statutory change in the Department of Defense's policy, in
the absence of a prior change in existing departmental regulations, is
undetermined.
The authors feel that the case for the retention of the existing
license policy in the Department of Defense is sound. The present patent
policy has been highly successful in so far as it has fostered a willing
cooperation between research and development contractors and the Department of Defense. To discourage contractors in their efforts by veering
toward any type of title policies would be unwise at a time in which the
national defense program is of such a vital importance. So long as there
are means to curb patent abuses by diligent governmental action, a possible weakening of the hopes for a strong national security would be a
grave disservice to the national welfare. The Department of Defense
must take industry as it finds it, and to date, by the clear weight of testimony which has come from the Washington hearings, traditional patent
incentives are still of paramount importance. Patriotic devotion to the
furtherance of buttressing national strength might not be enough to fill
the incentive gaps which would be created by a change. The arguments
for reform are numerous, and the reader is referred again to the formal
texts of the hearings for his own investigation. The authors submit that
these arguments are not so persuasive, or irrefutable as to justify the risks
which will accompany a change in the present Department of Defense
program. Indeed, the final direction of reform should become more
apparent as other governmental agencies begin to take a long, hard look at
the successful contracting operations now conducted by the Department
of Defense.
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